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and adversarial functions are concerned, theLankfordCourt citedStrickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (holding that a capital sentencing
hearing is enough like a trial to warrant the same adversarial standards as
a trial). The Court reasoned, therefore, that without notice of the issues to
be litigated at the penalty stage, the benefit of the adversarial process is
negated. Since in Lankford the trial judge was silent as to the principal
issue to be litigated (i.e. a possible death sentence), the Court found that
the adversarial process may have malfunctioned.
Since federal law requires that narrowing construction be given to
the three "vileness factors" (i.e. "torture, depravity of mind or aggravated
battery to the victim" Va. Code Ann. §19.2-264.4(C)), Virginia defense
counsel need to know upon which of the three factors the Commonwealth
intends to rely during the penalty phase of a capital murder trial and what
narrowing construction will be applied. Thus, after Lanlford, pretrial
litigation of Virginia's "vileness factors" becomes even more important.
See Lago, Litigating the "Vileness" Factor in Virginia, Capital Defense
Digest, this issue. Filing a Bill of Particulars allows defense counsel to
acquire notice of factor(s) upon which the Commonwealth intends to rely.
The purpose of presentencing orders, the Court noted, is "to elimi-
nate the need to address matters that are not in dispute, and thereby save
the valuable time of judges and lawyers." 111 S. Ct. at 1729. Thus, the
Bill of Particulars will not only provide notice of the issues to be litigated
at the sentencing phase of the capital trial, it will promote judicial
efficiency as well.
Summary and analysis by:
Wendy Freeman Miles
YATES v. EVATT
111 S. Ct. 1884 (1991)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS
Dale Robert Yates was charged with murder during the commission
of a robbery in Greenville County, South Carolina. Yates, armed with a
handgun, and Henry Davis, an accomplice, armed with a knife, entered a
store and accosted the proprietor. After acquiring the money, Yates shot
twice, wounding the proprietor slightly. Yates then fled. Davis remained
and scuffled with the proprietor. As the two struggled, the proprietor's
mother intervened. Davis stabbed her once and she died almost immedi-
ately. The proprietor thendrewapistolandkilledDavis. Yates was found
guilty of murder as an accomplice and sentenced to death. The Supreme
Court of South Carolina affirmed the conviction. State v. Yates, 280 S.C.
29, 310 S.E.2d 805 (1982).
Yates sought relief at state habeas asserting that the burden-shifting
effect of ajury instruction was unconstitutional. The instruction to which
Yates objected dictated that malice is implied or presumed from (1) the
"willful, deliberate, and intentional doing of an unlawful act" or (2) the
"use of a deadly weapon." Although the state court denied relief, the
Supreme Court of the United States remanded for further consideration in
light of its decisions in Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979) and
Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985). Yates v. Aiken, 474 U.S. 896
(1985). On remand, the state supreme court failed to apply retroactively
the principles settled in those decisions. The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari and remanded again for further proceedings. Yates v.
Aiken, 484 U.S. 211 (1987).
Upon second remand, the Supreme Court of South Carolina recog-
nized that the two charges regarding implied malice were erroneous;
however, it again denied relief, holding that the error was harmless. Yates
v. Aiken, 301 S.C. 214, 391 S.E.2d 530 (1989). In that opinion, the state
court claimed that the error was harmless because the jury did not have to
rely on the presumption of malice given the "facts" which the reviewing
court mistakenly posed as Davis lunging at the mother and stabbing,
giving her multiple wounds.
For the third time, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari
to review the case.
HOLDING
The United States Supreme Court held that the Supreme Court of
South Carolina applied the wrong standard in determining whether the
challenged instructions constituted harmless error. The Court also found
that the Supreme Court of South Carolina misread the trial court record to
which the standard was applied.
UndertheUnited States Supreme Court's analysis based onSandstrom
and Francis, the malice instruction given in Yates was erroneous because
it did not require the state to establish all elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (holding that
the fourteenth amendment protects the accused from conviction except
uponproof beyond areasonable doubt of every factnecessary to constitute
the crime with which he is charged). The instructions given to the jury in
this case may not be excused as harmless error because they erroneously
shifted the burden of proof to the defendant, thus violating Mullaney v.
Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
The United States Supreme Court found that the state court's inquiry
into the constitutionality of the jury's malice instruction did not satisfy the
properharmless error standard as promulgated in Chapman v. California,
386 U.S. 18 (1967). An error is harmless only if it appears "beyond a
reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the
verdict obtained." Id. at 24 (emphasis added). The state court employed
improper analysis in determining merely that it was not necessary for the
jury to rely on the unconstitutional presumption created by the malice
instruction.
ANALYSIS / APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
A. Jury Instruction Erroneous
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment requires that the
prosecution establish every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt
before an accused may be convicted. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
Instructions which shift this burden of proof on the issue of intent to the
defendant are unconstitutional. Mullaney, 421 U.S. 684 (1975). This rule
was developed further in Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979). In
Sandstrom, the jury was given an instruction that "the law presumes that
a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts." Id. at
513,524. This instruction was held unconstitutional as a violation ofboth
the Winship and Mullaney requirements. The Court applied the same
principle in Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985). The Francis
instructions stated that "the acts of a person of sound mind and discretion
are presumed to be the product of the person's will" and that a person "is
presumed to intend the natural andprobable consequences of his acts." Id.
at 316-318. These instructions, like those given in Sandstrom, fail to
comply with the requirements of Winship and Mullaney.
In Yates, the charge instructing the jurors on the issue of malice was
two-fold. The trial judge told the jury that malice is to be implied or
presumed upon (1) the willful, deliberate & intentional doing of an
unlawful act, and (2) the use of a deadly weapon.
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In the first instruction for implying or presuming malice on the part
of the defendant, the trial judge warned the jury that the presumption was
a rebuttable one. However, the United States Supreme Court rejected the
instruction despite this cautionary advice given by the judge. The Court's
concern was that jurors, while considering evidence tending to rebut
presumptions, continue to give weight to presumptive assertions rather
than disregarding them in favor of the evidence alone.
As to the second instruction for implying orpresuming malice on the
part of the defendant, the court warned the jury that admission of evidence
as to the circumstances surrounding use of a deadly weapon may remove
the presumption. This instruction is inherently contradictory and confuses
more than clarifies. As the Court pointed out, "language that merely
contradicts and does not explain a constitutionally infirm instruction will
not suffice to absolve the infirmity." Francis, 471 U.S. at 322.
B. Harmless Error Standard
When an error has been committed in the finding of guilt of an
accused, the United States Supreme Court has ruled that a test may be
applied to determine whether it appears "beyond a reasonable doubt that
the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained."
Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24 (emphasis added). The Chapman test is a two
step analysis in which the court first must ask what evidence the jury
actually considered in reaching its verdict. Then, the court must weigh the
probative force of that evidence as against the probative force of the error
standing alone.
The Supreme Court of South Carolina, however, applied a different
analysis in its treatment of harmless error. The state court's goal was to
determine whether it was beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would
have found it unnecessary to rely on the unconstitutional presumptions.
SeeRose v. Clark,478 U.S. 570,583 (1986) (holding thatSandstrom error
can be harmless). Based on this language, the state did not find the
constitutional error in its instruction to be a reversible error.
TheUnited States Supreme Court in this decision determined thatthe
Supreme Court of South Carolina misapplied the Rose v. Clark standard.
The inquiry should not have been whether it was unnecessary for the jury
to rely on the presumption; rather, to determine that the jury did not rely
on the presumption and thus no error resulted.
The Court, having set up the parameters of the test, examined the
entire record to determine what evidence the jury considered regarding
intent, removed from the presumptions themselves. It found that asser-
tions of Davis' "lunging" and inflicting "wounds" were unsubstantiated
by the record. The mother died of a single wound and no other evidence
tended to prove Davis' malice towards her. On this evidence, the Court
concluded that the state court could not infer beyond a reasonable doubt
that the presumptions did not contribute to the jury's finding.
C. Impact
Attorneys defending capital clients may learn important lessons
from this case. Harmless error is a difficult standard to meet. Given a
particular fact pattern, a Sandstrom error may be harmless under the Rose
v. Clark rule. See also Waye v. Townley, 871 F.2d 18 (4th Cir. 1989).
However, defense attorneys- should recognize that an error will not
automatically be harmless. Often, even when there is other evidence of
guilt, the evidence may not meet the harmless error analysis. For
additional analyses of the treatment of harmless error, see case summary
of Arizona v. Fulminante, Capital Defense Digest, this issue, and case
summary of Satterwhite v. Texas, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 1, No. 1,
p. 14 (1988) (errors found not to be ham-less).
Another important lesson is to review carefully the jury instructions
to be given at trial. Yates may support a challenge to the Virginia second
degree murder instruction on malice. That instruction also raises a
presumption but adds that the presumption disappears if a reasonable
doubt is raised. The reasonable doubt caveat can be said to contradict but
not explain the presumption. This may create the same confusion that the
court condemned in Yates and lead to a successful challenge to the
Virginia malice instruction for defense counsel.
Summary and analysis by:
Laura J. Fenn
ARIZONA v. FULMINANTE
111 S. Ct. 1246, (1991)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS
Defendant Oreste Fulminante was a suspect in the murder of his
11-year-old stepdaughter, who was killed on or around September 14,
1982 in Arizona. No charges were filed against him, and Fulminante
left for New Jersey where he was convicted on unrelated federal
charges and incarcerated in a federal prison in New York. While in the
penitentiary, Fulminante became friends with a former police officer
named Anthony Sarivola who was serving time for loansharking.
Sarivola was also an informant for the F.B.I. and was posing as an
organized crime figure.
Sarivola learned that Fulminante had been suspected of his
stepdaughter's murder. The F.B.I. instructed Sarivola to find out
more information concerning Fulminante. In October of 1983, Sarivola
offered to protect Fulminante from the rough treatment he was
beginning to receive from the other inmates, but told Fulminante that
he would have to know about Fulminante's involvement in the
stepdaughter's murder. Fulminante then admitted to Sarivola that he
had taken the stepdaughter to the desert, choked her, sexually as-
saulted her, made her beg for her life, and then shot her in the head.
Fulminante was released from prison in May of 1984 and made a
second confession to Sarivola's fiancee. Fulminante was indicted for
the first-degree murder of his stepdaughter on September 4, 1984.
Fulminante moved to suppress the first confession because it was
coerced, and the second because it was the fruit of the first confession.
The trial court allowed the confessions, convicted Fulminante of first
degree murder and sentenced to death. The Arizona State Supreme
Court, upon motion for reconsideration, found the confession was
coerced, decided that the use of a coerced confession could not be
harmless error, and ordered a retrial without use of the confession to
Anthony Sarivola. The Supreme Court granted certiorari upon appeal
by the State of Arizona.
HOLDING
In an opinion by Justice White, the Court affirmed the Arizona
State Supreme Court's decision and held that Fulminante's confes-
sion to Anthony Sarivola was coerced. In a second opinion written by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court reversed the reasoning of the
Arizona high court that use of a coerced confession is always revers-
ible error, and instead held that admission of an involuntary confes-
sion is subject to harmless error analysis. Arizona v. Fulminante, 111
